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Abstract—This article focuses on three challenges concerning the
use of cost-effectiveness thresholds to inform decision making
regarding which services a third-party payer will fund. First, how is
the appropriate cost-effectiveness threshold or threshold range to be
determined or, indeed, should there be a single threshold or multiple
thresholds? Second, how can the valuation of health benefits be
refined to better capture the value of treatments to patients and to
the economy as a whole? Third, how is the tension between cost-
effectiveness and the affordability and sustainability of health
services to be managed?
It concludes that whatever other factors are considered in addition to
cost-effectiveness, and whether the decision-making process is more
or less deliberative, cost-effectiveness thresholds are important.
Though there is a range of sources for identifying appropriate
thresholds, using the opportunity cost in terms of the health benefits
from displaced activities will minimize the problem of cost-
effective interventions not being affordable and will facilitate the
efficient use of scarce resources. Finally, although experience using
weighted quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) is currently very
limited, it is likely to be an important area in the future.
INTRODUCTION
Notions of a cost-effectiveness threshold lie at the heart of
any attempt to use cost-effectiveness evidence to inform
decisions as to which health services to provide. The aim of
this article is to review three challenges concerning the use
of cost-effectiveness thresholds to inform decision making
regarding which services a third-party payer will fund. First,
how is the appropriate cost-effectiveness threshold or thresh-
old range to be determined or, indeed, should there be a sin-
gle threshold or multiple thresholds? Second, how can the
valuation of health benefits be refined to better capture the
value of treatments to patients and to the economy as a
whole? Third, how is the tension between cost-effectiveness
and the affordability and sustainability of health services to
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be managed? These questions are of course linked, for exam-
ple, weighting quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) and using
a threshold cost per weighted QALY and having multiple
thresholds for different groups of QALYs (defined, for
instance, by severity of the underlying condition) are alterna-
tive means of recognizing that not all QALYs have the same
value.
These challenges are certainly ones with which high-
income countries (HICs) must grapple, but they are also very
much of relevance to low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs), although the thresholds at which services are
deemed cost-effective will be substantially lower, and the
more fundamental challenge for LMICs is to develop and
sustain Health Technology Assessment (HTA) decision-mak-
ing processes rather than to identify appropriate cost-effec-
tiveness thresholds.1 Cost-effectiveness thresholds are
important whenever an organization is concerned with
obtaining value for money from its health care spending.
They may be of particular relevance with respect to public
expenditure because they can increase the transparency and
accountability of decision making.
COST-EFFECTIVENESS AND MULTIPLE
OBJECTIVES
Before turning to the three challenges addressed in this arti-
cle, it is worth emphasizing that the relevance of cost-effec-
tiveness thresholds is independent of the specific form of
decision making. One of the key strengths of the economic
approach is its ability to combine several consequences of an
intervention in a single, widely applicable measure. Thus,
the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, in principle, cap-
tures the cost of the treatment, potential future cost savings,
and impacts on the patient’s health status and life expectancy
and facilitates comparisons of the implications of spending
in different therapeutic areas. Because it is highly unlikely
that a decision-making process would rely solely on cost-
effectiveness information, the issue arises as to how to com-
bine cost-effectiveness data with other relevant inputs to the
decision-making process. One important choice is between a
deliberative approach where cost-effectiveness is simply
considered alongside other factors or possibly is given prior-
ity but its importance and interpretation is influenced by the
other factors, and some form of multiple criteria decision
analysis (MCDA) that attempts to incorporate these other
factors formally and, importantly, is explicit regarding the
trade-offs between the differences sources of value.
A comparison of the MCDA approach with the National
Institute for Health and Care Excellence’s (NICE’s) appraisal
process emphasizes the many common elements but
highlights the key difference at the decision-making stage.
NICE engages in deliberative decision making using the
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio and other criteria.2 The
decision of the appraisal committee contains a description of
the factors that have influenced the decision, but rarely are
these quantified and the weight attached to different consid-
erations is unclear. With an MCDA these other criteria would
be quantified explicitly and their relative importance would
be reflected in a transparent set of weights.
Whichever approach is adopted, the importance of cost-
effectiveness thresholds is undiminished. If an MCDA
approach were adopted, cost-effectiveness thresholds would
still be relevant because the fundamental principle of oppor-
tunity cost remains. Thus, when making decisions with
respect to the allocation of a given budget, the benefits
expected from a new activity should exceed the loss of bene-
fits from displaced activities if a positive recommendation is
to be made. However, the valuation of the benefits would
now not be solely in terms of foregone QALYs but in terms
of the metric used in the MCDA to value the benefits of the
new activity, and the cost-effectiveness threshold would
need to be stated in terms of this metric.
DETERMINING THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS
THRESHOLD
As long as cost-effectiveness is one of the criteria used to
assist decision making, it will be necessary to specify a
threshold value (or a range of values) in order to inform
assessments of whether a particular intervention generates
benefits at an acceptable cost. Several potential sources of
values for the cost-effectiveness threshold have been identi-
fied: a value implied by past decisions, an estimated societal
willingness to pay for additional health benefit, a value
related to gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, and the
cost per unit of benefit of the services that would be
displaced.
Assuming some degree of consistency with respect to pre-
vious decisions, it is clearly possible to infer a threshold
from previous decisions. This has been done on a number of
occasions. Recently, Dakin et al.3 used logistic regression to
model NICE decisions to recommend or not recommend par-
ticular health technologies. Note that this approach assumes
that which incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) the
committee believed when it said “yes” or “no” is known and
that all factors relevant to the decision were incorporated in
that ICER (or are controlled for in the independent varia-
bles). But there is a more fundamental problem: do we want
future decisions to be determined by past decisions? To what
extent do past decisions reflect assessments of the value of
Cairns: Using Cost-Effectiveness Evidence 33
the health benefits displaced (either then or now)? Clearly, it
may be appropriate for the threshold to change over time.
Rather than studying the past decisions of a decision
maker, an alternative approach is to ask people directly to
value additional health benefits. Ryen and Svensson4
reviewed 24 studies estimating willingness-to-pay (WTP) for
a QALY, containing 383 unique estimates of the WTP for a
QALY. The trimmed mean and median estimates were found
to amount to 74,159 and 24,226 euros (2010 price level),
respectively. They noted the heterogeneity of studies, involv-
ing a wide range of countries, individual or societal perspec-
tives, general or specific populations, quality of life or life
expectancy, general health or specific condition. They found
that WTP for a QALY is significantly higher if the QALY
gain comes from life extension rather than quality of life
improvements and that the WTP for a QALY is dependent
on the size of the QALY gain.
A related stated preference approach is to use information
on the value of a statistical life. For example, the Department
of Health (DH) in England suggested the use of 60,000 per
QALY based on making a series of adjustments to the value
of preventing a road traffic fatality. The value of preventing
a road traffic fatality is estimated to be 1,637,420 (based on
stated preference estimate of WTP to reduce risk of death).
By making assumptions about the average age of male and
female fatalities, their predicted remaining life expectancy,
assuming a 1.5% discount rate and adjusting for health status
and the ratio of male to female fatalities, it is estimated that
on average 26.7 QALYs are lost per fatality. Dividing the
value of preventing a fatality by the estimated QALY loss
gives a value of £61,327.
An alternative approach is to specify the cost-effective-
ness threshold as a multiple of per capita income. The World
Health Organization’s (WHO’s) Commission on Macroeco-
nomics and Health 2001 argued that the value of preventing
a disability-adjusted life year (DALY) should be at least
equal to the per capita income but the true value might be up
to three times this due to other factors (such as pain and suf-
fering). Consequently, the WHO identifies three categories
of cost-effectiveness on their website: highly cost-effective
(less than the GDP per capita); cost-effective (between one
and three times GDP per capita); and not cost-effective
(more than three times GDP per capita).5
Willingness-to-pay valuations (and values related to
income) are potentially relevant if what is sought is an esti-
mate of the value placed on additional health benefits whose
purchase reduces overall consumption but less relevant if the
issue is one of how to spend a given budget. In the latter
case, the concern is to ensure that the value of the health
benefits displaced does not exceed the value of the health
benefits from the new activity.
To quote the NICE methods guide for technology
appraisal, “A technology can be considered to be cost effec-
tive if its health benefits are greater than the opportunity costs
of programmes displaced to fund the new technology.”6 This
is a useful insight at the conceptual level, but for it to help
identify an appropriate cost-effectiveness threshold we need
to know what purchasers of health care are giving up when
they implement NICE guidance. In the absence of such data
we can ask how health outcomes vary in response to changes
in health care spending. There are clearly many challenges in
making such an estimate: there are likely to be issues of data
quality; health care expenditure is likely to be endogenous;
health outcomes will be influenced by many factors (in addi-
tion to health care spending); and there will be time lags
between changes in spending and changes in health outcome.
Claxton et al.7 have reported a new central estimate of
£12,936 per QALY, which they suggest is “if anything, likely
to be an overestimate.” Their probabilistic model indicates
that there is an 89% chance the figure is less than £20,000
per QALY and a 97% chance that it is less than £30,000.
They go on to argue that
the consequences for the NHS of overestimating the
threshold are more serious than underestimating it. In
principle, a policy threshold . . . should be set below its
mean value to take account of the non-linear relationship
between the threshold and the additional net health benefit
offered by a technology.
These estimates have been challenged, in particular by the
Office of Health Economics, who claim that they are highly
uncertain and sensitive to the use of plausible alternative
assumptions.8 They particularly take issue with assumptions
that patients whose lives are saved will live as long as healthy
people of the same age and will enjoy better quality of life
than the average patient with the same disease. They argue
that the overall effect is to understate the true value of the
threshold.
Quite clearly, few countries are currently in a position to
undertake similar analyses and thus alternative ways of iden-
tifying appropriate thresholds would be of considerable inter-
est. Recently, Woods et al.9 have taken the estimated
relationship for England between the consumption value of
health and the health foregone when National Health Service
(NHS) expenditure is displaced and applied this in other
countries in order to identify appropriate cost-effectiveness
thresholds for these other countries. This approach does
require a number of strong assumptions; for example, that
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the relationship between the consumption value of health and
the cost-effectiveness threshold for health (the benefits fore-
gone when health care expenditure is displaced) is common
across countries. The authors wisely counsel caution when
interpreting their results. The value of this bold paper may
well lie as much in the stimulus it provides for further
research.
The issue of whether to have a single cost-effectiveness
threshold or multiple thresholds is closely linked to that of
valuing health benefits and, in particular, weighting QALYs.
To have a single threshold, either all QALYs must be valued
equally or the QALYs must first be weighted before estimat-
ing a cost per weighted QALY gained.
VALUING HEALTH BENEFITS
There is now considerable interest in value-based assessment
of new health technologies. Though the emphasis was ini-
tially on the relationship between price and assessments of
the value of a health technology, over time attention has
moved firmly to attempts to identify better ways to assess the
relative value of different health technologies. Attention has
focused on weighting QALYs to more accurately distinguish
the value of the health benefits in different circumstances
and on including a broader range of consequences of
interventions.
Health economics has a tradition of regarding all QALYs
as being of the same significance and value. One example of
this is the practice when estimating incremental cost-effec-
tiveness of adding together the QALYs of the entire patient
group and ignoring that some patients accrue more QALYs
than others and their identity. However, there are several
recent examples of cost-effectiveness thresholds differenti-
ated by health loss, such as the supplementary guidance
issued to the NICE appraisal committee and the interest
shown in various countries in valuing QALYs gained by
those in poorer health more highly than QALYs gained by
those in better health.
The instruction to the NICE Appraisal Committee in 2009
to treat life-extending, end-of-life treatments differently
from other health technologies was a significant departure
from the conventional approach. This change was introduced
as a means of increasing the proportion of new cancer drugs
recommended by NICE.10 Three criteria must be fulfilled in
order for a treatment to qualify as a life-extending, end-of-
life treatment: (1) the treatment is indicated for patients with
a short life expectancy, normally less than 24 months; (2)
there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the treatment
offers an extension to life, normally of at least an additional
three months, compared with current NHS treatment; and (3)
the treatment is licensed or otherwise indicated for small
patient populations normally not exceeding a cumulative
total of 7,000 for all licensed indications in England.6
This started as a form of weighting, but it fairly rapidly
metamorphosed into the application of multiple cost-effec-
tiveness thresholds. It represents the simplest form of QALY
weighting because only two cases are distinguished: QALYs
produced by life-extending, end-of-life treatments, and those
generated by all other treatments. To date the criteria have
been met on 30 occasions and the committee recommenda-
tions have been consistent with using a £50,000 per QALY
threshold for these end-of-life treatments (compared to the
£20,000 to £30,000 range for nonqualifying treatments).
Whether or not counting these health gains as being twice as
valuable as those received by other patients reflects societal
preferences remains unclear. A recent review of 17 studies
concluded that the existing evidence is mixed.11 Leaving
aside the merits or otherwise of the policy, the experience
with end-of-life treatments demonstrates the feasibility of
weighting QALYs (or using multiple thresholds).
There has been increasing interest in valuing health gains
differentially depending on the state of health of the patient,
and it has been suggested that this might be indicated by the
proportional QALY shortfall associated with the condition of
the patient. For example, there is agreement in The Nether-
lands that the cost per QALY gained that is acceptable is
greater the higher the proportional shortfall in QALYs. The
proportional shortfall is measured by the disease-related
QALY loss divided by the remaining QALYs expected in the
absence of the disease.12
Similarly, in England, NICE proposed that the weight
attached to health benefits should be related to the burden of
illness. The burden of illness is measured by the proportional
QALY shortfall—that is, the shortfall in QALYs considered
relative to what people could expect without the condition at
the time of treatment. However, following consultation, a
decision was taken not to change the technology appraisal
methodology in the short run.
The Third Norwegian National Priority Setting Commit-
tee13 have recommended that the cost-effectiveness threshold
should vary according to the health loss experienced by the
patient group. This is to be measured by healthy life years
lost if given standard treatment compared to a long and
healthy life. The underlying justification for the approach is a
desire to maximize health and to distribute it fairly. Conse-
quently, it is proposed that a health gain has a higher value
the more it benefits the worse-off patients. An illustration is
provided with four levels of health loss each with its own
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cost-effectiveness threshold (<NOK 250,000; <NOK
250,000–500,000; <NOK 500,000–750,000; and <NOK
750,000–1,000,000, where 1 Norwegian Krone or NOK
equals approximately $0.11 USD).
A final instance of innovative thinking regarding the defi-
nition and measurement of benefits from adopting new health
technologies comes from the DH in England. The DH pro-
posal for including wider societal benefits (WSB)14 is pri-
marily concerned with the effect of treatment on others (the
impact on the patient is assumed to be captured through the
QALY). The DH defines WSB as the difference between the
amount of resources a patient contributes to society (produc-
tion) and the amount they utilize (consumption). The adop-
tion of any proposed treatment will lead to a change in WSBs
(e.g., as one treatment is replaced by another) and if an inter-
vention has a positive incremental cost, other NHS activities
will be displaced and these activities will also have associ-
ated WSBs. Thus, the proposal concerns capturing benefits
not currently reflected in the QALY rather than weighting
QALYs per se. However, the NICE proposal (in response)
suggested that the wider societal impact could be captured
by estimating the absolute QALY shortfall, and this in turn
could be used as a reason for weighting the benefits of a treat-
ment more highly.
Though weighting health benefits and using different
thresholds for different unweighted health benefits can be
viewed as alternatives, there is presumably a limit to how
many different thresholds decision makers are comfortable
with using. Thus, if it is thought desirable to distinguish
many classes of health benefit, it might be easier to calculate
weighted QALYs and compare to a single threshold. Simi-
larly, if more fine-grained distinctions between different
treatments are sought (for example, recognizing the propor-
tion of the health benefits generated by treatments falling in
different categories rather than assigning all of the benefits
from a particular treatment to a particular category), then
applying a weighting scheme will be more feasible than
using multiple thresholds. Thus, with respect to the end-of-
life example, rather than all of the health benefits of a treat-
ment being adjudged either to qualify or not, the proportion
of patients who would be expected to obtain an extension to
life of at least three months could be assessed and taken into
account when weighting the QALYs.
COST-EFFECTIVENESS AND AFFORDABILITY
Health technologies can be assessed as cost-effective, but
that does not necessarily mean that they are affordable.
Affordability and sustainability of health services depend on
sufficient funds being made available. The problem arises
because there is no automatic link between the size of health
care budgets and the cost-effectiveness of health care spend-
ing. Health care budgets change over time as a consequence
of a wide range of factors and not just changing opportunities
to produce health benefit. How is the tension between cost-
effectiveness and the affordability and sustainability of
health services to be managed?
As noted above, a widely used approach is to specify the
cost-effectiveness threshold as a multiple of per capita
income.5 However, the use of multiples of per capita income
ignores opportunity cost and also threatens sustainability.
Revill et al.16 argued that such cost-effectiveness bench-
marks lack a theoretical or empirical basis and make many
health care interventions notionally cost-effective. Because
they take no account of whether resources could be better
used elsewhere, the use of WHO thresholds “is likely to
reduce overall population health and exacerbate health care
inequalities.”
Using a recent UK assessment of health forgone through
resources being committed to particular interventions and
assuming that the relationship between health care spending
and health attainment across countries is subject to diminish-
ing returns, suggests that a suitable benchmark for lower
income countries is unlikely to be higher than 0.52 GDP per
capita.16
The relevance of the WHO threshold has recently been
examined by Newall et al.,17 who reviewed the cost-effec-
tiveness of HPV vaccinations in 26 LMICs and of rotavirus
vaccinations in 15 LMICs. They found that vaccination pro-
grams being found “very cost-effective” (ICER < GDP per
capita) did not ensure that they were funded. However, cost-
effectiveness may be playing a role in that programs with
ICERs more than twice GDP per capita were less likely to be
implemented. They concluded that “an intervention having
cost per DALY averted less than per capita income was not
sufficient for vaccination programme to be funded” and sug-
gested that this results from the difference between afford-
ability and cost-effectiveness.
In England, NICE assesses cost-effectiveness by compar-
ing the cost per QALY gained with a cost-effectiveness
threshold range and the potential budget impact is only rele-
vant insofar as “the Committee may require more robust evi-
dence on the effectiveness and cost effectiveness of
technologies that are expected to have a large impact on
NHS resources.”6 It has been suggested that the threshold be
set “to optimally exhaust” (maximize the health gain) from
the fixed budget.15 This firmly places the emphasis on a com-
parison with the cost per QALY of displaced services and has
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the advantage that it can reduce the tension between cost-
effectiveness and affordability by linking the threshold to the
predetermined budget.
If the health care budget is relatively fixed in the short run
(or at any rate not responsive to changing opportunities to
generate health benefits), changing opportunities to produce
health will not lead to changes in levels of spending but
rather in the mix of activities. A new set of cost-effective
treatments is funded by reducing spending on some less cost-
effective treatments.
The alternative would be to increase or decrease the
resources available for purchasing health services in response
to changing opportunities to produce benefit. This would
involve making a judgment regarding the value of additional
health benefits, which in turn will depend on a number of fac-
tors, such as the wealth of the country and the relative impor-
tance of improving health vis-a-vis other goods. Cost-
effective new treatment opportunities would be funded by
increasing spending rather than displacing existing
treatments.
In practice, budgets are not entirely exogenously deter-
mined, and improved opportunities to buy health over time
will encourage expansion of budgets. But to have budgets
closely following the changing opportunities to produce ben-
efit leads to difficulties financing health care, and it will be
necessary to let changes in the mix of services provided
“solve” the problem of changes in opportunities to produce
benefit, although this can produce a different set of chal-
lenges with respect to the delivery of care.
A recent example of the tension in HICs arises with the
directly acting antivirals for treating hepatitis C. Several of
these are clearly cost-effective means of treating hepatitis C
(at least for a range of patient subgroups and in HICs). But to
immediately take these opportunities for the cost-effective
treatment of patients requires a marked increase in budgets
or substantial reallocation of current spending. In LMICs
with very limited budgets for purchasing health care and an
arbitrarily defined (overly high) cost-effectiveness threshold
there will be a permanent tension between affordability and
cost-effectiveness.
THRESHOLDS AND DRUG PRICING
It is recognized that the use of an explicit cost-effective-
ness threshold to inform decisions over which health
technologies to adopt enables the manufacturer to capture
the value of their innovation by pricing to meet the
threshold.18 Drug prices are endogenous and are not
generally set independent of the reimbursement decision-
making process. Managed entry agreements or patient
access schemes that have become common in several
countries in recent years provide a mechanism whereby
pricing to meet the threshold is facilitated. For example,
in England, once an appraisal is underway it becomes
clearer how a committee will regard the likely cost-effec-
tiveness of a drug and what size of downward adjustment
in price would be required to make a positive adoption
decision reasonably likely. Another example of this arises
with the commissioning of vaccines in the UK where an
initial assessment is made as to whether the vaccine could
be cost-effective and the basis for this, and this is known
by the manufacturer prior to the tendering process.
The endogeneity of drug prices has led Basu19 to sug-
gest that cost-effectiveness thresholds are irrelevant. He
argues against the use of explicit cost per QALY thresh-
olds on the grounds that it gives manufacturers an incen-
tive to set prices to just “meet” the threshold, thus
transferring surplus from the third-party payer to the man-
ufacturer. His “dynamic” alternative using league tables
crucially assumes that coverage decisions can be readily
reversed. However, to do so might be reputationally
costly and problematic in that treatments will be removed
from one particular patient group and replaced with a
new treatment for another (different) patient group. More
fundamentally, the solution to sharing the surplus lies not
in discarding explicit cost-effectiveness thresholds but
rather in developing policies directed at achieving the
desired level of sharing.
Though a higher threshold, other things being equal,
will provide a stronger incentive to invest in drug devel-
opment, cost-effectiveness thresholds are not a suitable
means of resolving the broader issues of achieving the
desired level and mix of research and development activ-
ity. More fundamental measures are likely to be required,
such as the divorce of drug production and pricing from
the activity of research and development advocated
recently by McGuire et al.20
The issue of the sharing of surplus between the health
services and drug and medical device manufacturers and its
implications for research and development activity, patient
access to health technologies (innovative or otherwise), and
wider economic concerns such as employment, growth, and
trade is beyond the scope of this article. However, it might
be observed that, though the cost-effectiveness threshold is a
powerful means ensuring health services make the best use
of their limited resources, to address these broader concerns
requires some additional policy levers.
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CONCLUSIONS
Whatever other factors are considered in addition to cost-
effectiveness, and whether the decision-making process is
more or less deliberative, cost-effectiveness thresholds are
important. Though there are a range of sources for identify-
ing appropriate thresholds, using the opportunity cost in
terms of the health benefits from displaced activities will
minimize the problem of cost-effective interventions not
being affordable and will facilitate the efficient use of scarce
resources. Experience using weighted QALYs is currently
very limited, but given growing interest, this is likely to be
an important area in the future.
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